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Abstract  
The impact that hydrogen and fuel cell technology can have on the security of European 
transport fuel supply is addressed in this paper. This impact depends primarily on the 
primary energy commodities that serve as feedstock in the production of hydrogen. Natural 
gas as feedstock does not provide any improvement of security of supply. Coal with carbon 
capturing and sequestration provides in some respects a more secure supply of energy as will 
nuclear power. Renewable electricity and biomass based hydrogen does, however, offer a more 
secure supply in the sense that they are domestic and renewable. 
Acknowledgements: 
This study is carried through as a part of the Zero Regio project financed through the 
European Union’s 6th framework programme for research and technological 
development. The Zero Regio project tests and demonstrates hydrogen infrastructure 
solutions in Frankfurt (Germany) and Mantova (Italy) and at the same time explores 
how the hydrogen and fuel cell solutions will work in a socioeconomic context. 
Valuable comments from the project partners are gratefully acknowledged. 
Academic disciplines involved: 
Energy economics 
Keywords:  
Hydrogen feedstock, renewable and non-renewable resources 
Address for correspondence: 
Anders Chr. Hansen,  
Department of Environmental, Social and Spatial Change (ENSPAC),  
Roskilde University, P.O. Box 260, DK-4000 Roskilde, DENMARK 
Phone:   +45 4674 2000 
Direct Phone: +45 4674 2860 
Cell Phone:  +45 6167 0592 
E-mail:  anders@ruc.dk 
 
  
Contents 
EECG Research Paper Series.............................................................................................. 1 
Abstract ................................................................................................................................. 2 
Abstract ................................................................................................................................. 2 
Acknowledgements:............................................................................................................ 2 
Academic disciplines involved:......................................................................................... 2 
Keywords:............................................................................................................................. 2 
Address for correspondence: ............................................................................................. 2 
Introduction............................................................................................................................. 5 
Supply Security and Risks of Energy Supply Disruption ............................................. 5 
Strategies to Secure Energy Supply .................................................................................. 5 
Can hydrogen contribute to supply security?................................................................. 6 
The Convertibility of Hydrogen........................................................................................ 6 
Alternative hydrogen feedstocks ...................................................................................... 7 
Fossil Energy based Hydrogen ............................................................................................ 7 
Natural gas and coal price linkage to the oil price ......................................................... 7 
Market Power and Geopolitical Risks .............................................................................. 9 
Global Scarcity ................................................................................................................... 13 
Non-Fossil Energy based Hydrogen................................................................................. 17 
Non-fossil Resources and Prices ................................................................................. 17 
Renewable Resources in Europe ................................................................................. 17 
Hydrogen and security of energy supply ........................................................................ 20 
Oil and gas dependency...................................................................................................... 22 
Oil and gas dependency ratio.......................................................................................... 22 
Conclusions ........................................................................................................................... 25 
Literature ............................................................................................................................ 26 
 
 Tables   
Table 1. Proven Coal Reserves at End-2002 (Mt) ............................................................. 12 
Table 2. Supply security impacts of substituting oil by alternative feedstock as 
primary energy basis for transport fuels. .......................................................................... 20 
  
Figures   
 
Figure 1. Natural Gas and Oil Prices 1976-2005.................................................................. 8 
Figure 2. European Coal and Oil Prices  1980-2006............................................................ 9 
Figure 3. World Proven Oil Reserves 2005. ....................................................................... 10 
Figure 4. World Proven Natural Gas Reserves, 2005. ...................................................... 11 
Figure 5. World Oil Production by Source ........................................................................ 14 
Figure 6. Ratio of Foreign to Domestically Produced Non-Renewable Energy in Main 
Regions of the World in 2005............................................................................................... 15 
Figure 7. European Share of Global Non-Renewable Primary Energy Production. ... 16 
Figure 8. Contribution of Renewable Energy Sources to Total Electricity Supply...... 18 
Figure 9.  World Hydropower Potential. ........................................................................... 18 
Figure 10. Share of Non-Hydro Renewables in Electricity Generation in OECD 
Countries, 1997 and 2002...................................................................................................... 19 
Figure 11. Primary Production and Gross Inland Consumption of Oil and Natural 
Gas as Ratios to GDP for European Economies (2004, MJ/€)......................................... 23 
Figure 12. Primary Production and Gross Inland Consumption of Oil and Natural 
Gas as Ratios to GDP for European Economies with Rates below 10 MJ per € (2004, 
MJ/€). ...................................................................................................................................... 24 
Figure 13. Oil and Natural Gas Dependency and Per Capita Income in Europe (2004).
.................................................................................................................................................. 25 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 5 
The supply security of 
hydrogen as transport fuel 
 
Introduction 
Supply Security and Risks of Energy Supply Disruption 
 “Security of energy supply” has a diversity of meanings. It can refer to long or short 
term energy supply, to supply problems related to geological, geopolitical or market 
power factors, to vulnerabilities of the global fuel throughput and national power 
grid balance, and to several other aspects. In a recent report from the International 
Energy Agency (IEA) (2007a) the distinction is made between a price component and 
a physical availability component of supply security. International Energy Agency 
(IEA) (2007b) also stresses that supply security is a question of the global demand. In 
casu the surge in global energy demand from China and India and other emerging 
economies. 
From a strictly economic point of view supply constraints boil down to higher prices 
– in particular, when it is viewed relative to demand. Therefore, supply security and 
price stability are two sides of the same coin. From a geopolitical point of view, 
however, the threat of supply constraints undermines political independence and 
this adds a dimension to the problem which is of equally high societal concern. 
Furthermore, the reliability of a continuous flow or throughput of energy is 
important for risk assessment of investment and for the cost of infrastructure and 
security measures. 
In the following we examine three supply security aspects of hydrogen feedstocks 
related to the international energy markets  
Price dependence 
Risk of market power and the use of it for political purposes 
Global scarcity 
Finally we examine the vulnerability of the European economies to oil and gas price 
increases. 
Strategies to Secure Energy Supply 
The responses to risks associated with the supply of energy to the European 
economies are as diverse as the sources. Demand side regulation reduces the 
dependence of the energy supply. Diversification of energy sources and enhancing 
their substitutability make the market less vulnerable to disruptions in supply from 
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individual sources. Investment in domestic energy resources build up an energy 
capacity that can not be controlled by foreign powers. Distributed rather than 
centralised networks offers insurance benefits supporting the resilience of the system 
balances (fuel throughput and voltage). 
Such achievements in the security of energy supply come at a cost, but in some cases 
they can entail side benefits neutralising these. Demand side regulation can constrain 
some economic activities, but can also help directing focus at energy uses with little 
or no purpose. Diversification policies could lead to use of energy technologies that 
are not cost competitive, but the very use of them also entails learning economies 
that make them competitive in the long run. Domestic energy resources can be more 
expensive than imported energy commodities, but the trade balance effects can be 
important in many countries. Distributed energy production and conversion forgo 
much of the scale economies in the sector, but enhances the opportunities to exploit 
economies of scope: The combined production of various forms of energy 
commodities, notably power and heat. 
Can hydrogen contribute to supply security? 
The societal priorities pursued by the energy policy of virtually every country 
include security of energy supply, low cost of energy - and thus good options for 
economically beneficial activities using energy consuming processes – and low 
environmental pressure caused by the production and use of energy. 
Considering the fundamental role of energy in achieving high rates of productivity 
growth in the past, the achievement of simultaneous progress in all three dimensions 
represents huge macroeconomic challenges. 
There are trade-offs between all three priorities but win-win options and even win-
win-win options are also available. 
The topic of this paper is the role that can be played by automotive use of hydrogen 
and fuel cell technology in these trade-offs. Will the technology make it easier or 
more difficult to meet the macroeconomic challenges? 
The Convertibility of Hydrogen 
The responses to the supply security challenge include diversification of energy 
supply sources and the increasing the market share of the sources that are most 
reliable.  
In the power and heat sector, the formerly strong oil dependency have been relieved 
by a range of other primary energy supply solutions such as natural gas, nuclear, 
coal, biomass, and wind. Diversification of fuel supply for the transport sector, 
however, has turned out to be much more difficult, and it remains almost completely 
fuelled by oil based fuels. Even when alternatives are potentially cost competitive 
they seem to be unable to be successful unless they are introduced in coordination 
with a range of other innovations along the fuel chain and the vehicle supply. This 
situation is often referred to as a “technological lock-in”. 
The H2&FC technologies offer a potential solution to this because of its convertibility 
to and from any other energy carrier. The problem is that conversion costs energy as 
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well as non-energy resources and that the establishment of conversion capacities 
requires thorough changes in infrastructure and technology throughout the WtW 
chain. 
Thus the question of the primary energy basis for hydrogen is unavoidable for the 
planning efforts related to implementation of hydrogen and fuel cell technologies in 
automotive use. Diversification is not only a matter of the fuel. More important is the 
primary energy serving as feedstock in the production of fuels. 
Alternative hydrogen feedstocks 
The question is inspired by the experimental use of hydrogen for transport in a range 
of demonstration projects. In the Zero Region project hydrogen is supplied to and 
used from filling stations in Frankfurt a.M., Germany and Mantova, Italy. The 
production of hydrogen represents the two production technologies that are 
commercially viable in production of hydrogen for industrial use at the present: 
Electrolysis and natural gas reforming and thus the two primary energy feedstocks 
for hydrogen: Electricity and natural gas. 
Much of the power added to the European power grids in the recent past has been 
based on natural gas and coal, but it is unlikely that it will be advantageous in any 
respect to use fossil fuels for power generation and then subsequently use the 
electricity for the production of hydrogen. The combined conversion loss from the 
two processes will almost certainly exceed that of direct production of hydrogen 
from fossil fuels. 
Thus, we focus on hydrogen from electrolysis based on non-fossil power versus 
hydrogen produced from natural gas.  
 
Fossil Energy based Hydrogen 
Natural gas and coal price linkage to the oil price 
The price of natural gas is closely linked to the price of oil. Contracts about natural 
gas delivered in the future are typically indexed to the spot market oil price 6-12 
months before delivery. The result is shown in the figure below. 
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Figure 1. Natural Gas and Oil Prices 1976-2005. 
Source: See Hansen (2007). 
The figure shows that on the international natural gas market the price measured in 
€/GJ follows the price of oil in the preceding year quite closely. A good estimate of 
the natural gas price in a given year is simply 81.2% of the oil price in the preceding 
year as indicated by the estimated natural gas price curve. Note the prices here are 
deflated to the purchasing power of € in 2005. If we use current prices natural gas can 
be estimated as 84.2% of the oil price the preceding year.   
There have been several European attempts to develop a natural gas market that has 
a price formation which is independent from the oil price. They seem to have been 
fruitless so far and the most important foreign supplier for Europe, Russia, has 
announced that its policy is to continue the oil price indexing practice and 
furthermore to follow the market price on oil as it results from the OPEC cartel 
agreements. 
The fundamental economic reason for the close link between oil and natural gas is 
that they are very close substitutes for heating and electricity purposes. They will 
become even closer substitutes as compressed natural gas and natural gas based 
hydrogen gain market shares as transport fuels. 
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Figure 2. European Coal and Oil Prices  1980-2006. 
Source: International Energy Agency (IEA): Energy prices and taxes. Database. http://www.oecd.org, 
12.11.07. 
The coal prices follow the oil price very closely too. Statistical analysis of the series 
showed in figure 2 revealed very significant elasticities of 0.74 for steam coal and 1.12 
for coking coal prices to the average IEA crude oil import price. 
Coal is a substitute for oil in many respects and is very energy consuming in 
transport. To the extent that coal is substituted for oil as feedstock in fuel production, 
we must expect this close relation to become even stronger. Additionally, a value 
added chain analysis by Gerling, Rempel et al. (2006) showed that about half the cost 
of coal in Europe in 2005 was transport costs that vary closely with the price of oil. 
Summarizing, the price data don’t support the idea that it should be possible to 
escape the oil price by substituting oil by other fossil fuels as feedstock in transport 
fuel production. On the contrary, the more such a substitution takes place, the closer 
the prices of the alternative will tend to change in parallel to the oil price. 
Market Power and Geopolitical Risks 
The geographical concentration of oil and gas resources is probably the main source 
of concern about supply security. The remaining oil reserves are located in a very 
limited range of countries, which gives opportunities for abuse of market power not 
only for economic reasons but also by the governments controlling it for foreign 
policy purposes. Market power is when the individual supplier or a group of 
suppliers can affect the level of supply to the market. If a reduction of supply from 
one producer is compensated by increased supply from other producers that 
producer does not posses market power. 
The figure below shows the 9 countries that possess 70% of the remaining proven oil 
reserves in the world. 
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Figure 3. World Proven Oil Reserves 2005. 
Data source: BP statistical review database 2006. 
The possibility of such few suppliers to dominate prices and conditions through 
collusion is well known and has been used by the OPEC cartel since 1973 with the 
exception of the 1990s. With supply still more concentrated on fewer countries it 
becomes still more likely that the cartel discipline can be maintained and 
strengthened. 
Replacing oil based transport fuels by natural gas based fossil fuels is one of the 
obvious solutions to the problem that has been pursued by Europe, but also 
elsewhere around the world, in the recent years.  Natural gas is also characterised by 
emitting fewer pollutants by combustion than is known from petrol and diesel. 
Natural gas is reserves are, however, not evenly distributed across the planet. The 
figure below shows the share of world proven gas reserves located in the nine oil 
countries. 
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Figure 4. World Proven Natural Gas Reserves, 2005. 
Data source: BP statistical review database 2006. 
The major natural gas suppliers are also to a high degree identical with the major oil 
suppliers. The increasingly important natural gas supplier, Russia, has announced 
that its policy is to continue the oil price indexing practice and furthermore to follow 
the market price on oil as it results from the OPEC cartel agreements. The figures 
below show the share of world oil and gas reserves in the countries that are relevant 
to European natural gas supply (i.e., excluding North and Latin America and the 
Pacific). 
The countries with more than 1.5% of the world proven natural gas reserves that are 
close to Europe possess 75% of the world proven reserves. The same countries 
control 70% of the world proven oil reserves.  
Substituting natural gas for oil as primary energy source for transport provides an 
option to switch to an alternative as oil supply constraints emerge. But since the 
suppliers are largely the same and equally few, it is hard to expect a future of the 
natural gas market without collusion. The gas exporting countries have already 
formed the “Gas Exporting Countries Forum” and it is widely debated whether to 
develop it to a “Gas-OPEC”.  
The concerns related to political use of the market power at the oil market dates back 
to the notion that Middle East conflict was either a cause or an excuse for the first oil 
crisis in 1973-74 or both. Recent developments in Georgia and Ukraine – without 
claiming any deeper similarities – have convinced many Europeans that the gas 
market also has its power structures. 
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The oil price is particularly in a tight market affected by temporary supply 
disruptions at source due to, e.g., social conflict in Venezuela and Nigeria and 
climatic events. There is no reason to rule out similar events disrupting the natural 
gas supply.  
Thus, the gains in supply security from substituting oil as the basis for transport fuels 
by natural gas are certainly positive, but they should not be exaggerated. 
Substituting transport fuel feedstock from oil to coal would, however, base European 
transport on a much more abundant primary energy source which would also be 
much more dispersed. 
 
Table 1. Proven Coal Reserves at End-2002 (Mt) 
 
Source: International Energy Agency (IEA) (2004) 
The reserve estimates shown in the table indicate that supplies of coal could be 
maintained from a much more diverse range of countries, including many OECD 
countries. Hydrogen could be produced from coal like from natural gas and the CO2 
released in the process can be captured and sequestered.  
Even though there are coal reserves in many countries, the bulk of it is concentrated 
just as the oil and natural gas resources. Only 6 countries (USA, Russia, China, India, 
Australia, and South Africa) control 85% of the global hard coal reserves and 
production (Gerling, Rempel et al. (2006)). The risk that these countries will develop 
a coal cartel parallel to OPEC by is, however, not overwhelming. 
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In the future the estimates of economically exploitable coal resources could be 
limited by two developments. First, transport costs are a major component in the cost 
of coal. According to Gerling, Rempel et al. (2006) it made up about half of the cost in 
2005. Inclusion of international transport in the international climate policy efforts 
could make international transport more expensive and thus, e.g., South African coal 
less interesting to European markets. Similarly, carbon capturing and sequestration 
could become compulsory for future coal power plants in Europe and it will also add 
to the cost. 
The limiting factor for the use of coal for hydrogen production in Europe is, however, 
not so much the resource scarcity, but much more the cost and capacity of CO2 
capturing and sequestration.  
Summing up, the geographical distribution of the natural gas resources does not 
suggest market structure that is much different from the oil market. Neither will it 
differ significantly with respect to the countries that are able to pursue their goals 
through this market power. Coal does, however, - notwithstanding its environmental 
and energy efficiency drawbacks – offer an energy source with good prospects for 
supply security.  
Global Scarcity 
There is long standing debate between resource pessimists foreseeing exhaustion of 
non-renewable fossil energy resources and resource optimists claiming that proven 
oil reserves have continued to rise despite increasing oil extraction. Irrespective of 
who is right, however, the economic concerns rest on the geological fact that even if 
there is enough oil for 50 or 100 years there will be a point beyond which supply 
cannot grow at the same rate as demand. This is the peak of oil production.  
The estimates of ultimately recoverable oil resources in the world has increased 
during the recent decades, but the actual ultimately recoverable oil resources is by 
definition constant and the remaining oil resources are shrinking. Because of this 
finiteness the supply of conventional oil will peak. The existing conventional oil 
fields in the OECD countries have already peaked and supply from other non-OPEC 
sources are expected to peak within the coming two decades. However, with 
sufficient investments it should be possible to get more out of the existing reserves, 
discover and develop new reserves and add non-conventional oil. 
 
 14 
 
Figure 5. World Oil Production by Source 
Source: International Energy Agency (IEA) (2004) 
The International Energy Agency (IEA) (2004) expects the world production of oil (all 
sources and non-conventional oil included) to peak around 2030. The peak may 
occur up to 5 years later, but it can also occur as early as around 2020. 
The recent difficulties of oil supply to the world market in keeping pace with the 
surge in oil demand suggests that the investments required to bring the remaining oil 
on stream may be larger than previously assumed. 
European energy policies have in many countries supported the substitution of oil 
and coal in heating and electric power generation by natural gas. However, even 
though the resources are enough for sustaining the consumption in 2004 for 66 years 
(International Energy Agency (IEA) (2004)) the natural gas production will peak at 
some time - just a little later than oil.  
It follows directly from these geological realities that replacing oil as the primary 
energy basis for transport fuel by natural gas could delay or circumvent the oil peak 
in a short period of time, but only to hasten the natural gas peak. 
The International Energy Agency (IEA) (2006) begins the World Energy Outlook 2006 
with the following statement: “The energy future which we are creating is unsustainable. 
If we continue as before, the energy supply to meet the needs of the world economy over the 
next twenty-five years is too vulnerable to failure arising from under-investment, 
environmental catastrophe or sudden supply interruption.” 
One of the root causes of this unsustainability is that energy is based on non-
renewable resources and, in particular, fossil fuel combustion. For Europe, the 
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finiteness of these resources is important than for other parts of the world. Europe 
consumed in 2005 18.5% of the non-renewable energy resources that were consumed 
that year, but only 7.9% of the global production was produced in Europe. Europe 
relies on foreign supplies of non-renewable primary energy to a degree that is not 
paralleled by any other region in the World. 
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Figure 6. Ratio of Foreign to Domestically Produced Non-Renewable Energy in Main 
Regions of the World in 2005. 
Source: Author’s calculation based on data from Gerling, Rempel et al. (2006). 
In the future, this dependency on dwindling non-renewable resources from other 
regions of the world because the Europe’s share of the remaining non-renewable 
energy resources is less than half its share of non-renewable primary energy 
production in 2005. 
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Figure 7. European Share of Global Non-Renewable Primary Energy Production. 
Future production of non-renewable primary energy is calculated as the sum of reserves and 
resources at the end of 2005. Reserves are the proven deposits that are economically 
exploitable with known technologies. Resources are potential reserves taking into account new 
discoveries, progress in extraction technology, and higher energy prices. Within the carbon 
dioxide absorption capacity of the global carbon cycle it is, however, not feasible to combust all 
of the remaining resources without carbon capturing and sequestration. Adding the cost of 
carbon capturing and sequestration to the cost of producing fossil energy will probably reduce 
the estimates of economically exploitable fossil fuel resources.  
Source: Author’s calculation based on data from Gerling, Rempel et al. (2006). 
 
The figure shows that continued reliance on fossil fuels will make Europe more 
dependent on resources outside of Europe that are becoming more and more scarce. 
These realities are in contrast to the societal priorities in Europe of a higher share of 
domestically controlled energy supply and a lower reliance on dwindling non-
renewable energy sources. 
Thorium represents a remarkable exception, which is expected to a very important 
feedstock for fourth generation nuclear power, but the technology is not yet 
developed. 
The conclusion to this is that the long term supply security problem – the geological 
scarcity – is more serious for Europe than for other regions in the world. Except for 
thorium, the exhaustible energy sources in Europe will be exhausted within a 
relatively short time horizon. The energy resources that Europe commands in the 
future are simply not the non-renewable ones. 
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Non-Fossil Energy based Hydrogen 
Non-fossil Resources and Prices 
The non-fossil resources available for hydrogen production includes renewable 
electricity sources that can be transformed to hydrogen via electrolysis (possibly by 
high temperature) and biomass from which hydrogen can be extracted by 
gasification or fermentation. The prices may vary in parallel with the fossil fuel 
prices for the same reasons: They are substitutes to fossil fuels and their production 
and transport can be energy consuming. As hydrogen enables a more widespread 
use of this energy in transport activities they become closer substitutes to oil.  
Renewable Resources in Europe 
The alternatives to non-renewable energy include renewables like hydro, wind, 
wave, geothermal, solar, waste (all grid dependent) and biofuels. Europe is well 
endowed with these resources, but their energy potential cannot be accounted for in 
exactly the same way as the non-renewable resources.  Moreover, the usefulness of 
their energy is much higher since the grid-dependent energy sources don’t involve 
the conversion loss that is characteristic of fossil fuel combustion. 
Renewable energy resources are classified in theoretical (or scientific), technical, and 
realisable potential. The scientific potential can be estimated with a high degree of 
accuracy based on meteorological and other physical observations. The technical 
potential depends to a higher degree on assessments of the efficiency of available 
technologies. The realisable potential is, however, difficult to estimate for a number 
of reasons. One of them is that renewable energy technologies are more area 
intensive than exploitation of most non-renewables is. The value of alternative uses 
of area plays a decisive role for how much renewable energy is available. However, 
similar area constraints are limiting realistic non-renewable energy production 
depending on the location of carbon sequestration and nuclear power plant and 
waste deposits. 
The area requirement of renewable resources is accentuated by the property that 
most of them (wind, wave, solar, geothermal) are power and heat sources requiring 
proximity to populated areas or a transmission system which enables transport over 
long distances without loss of energy. 
Thus, it is difficult to calculate the exact amount of renewable energy that could be 
harvested in Europe. Acceptance of energy technologies and of actual location of 
plants and infrastructure, future investments in the European transmission grid and 
the progress rate in performance and cost of energy technologies are decisive factors, 
which are hard to quantify or predict. However, the present intensity of use of 
renewables in electricity supply could be an indicator of at least how well Europe is 
equipped with these factors so far. 
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Figure 8. Contribution of Renewable Energy Sources to Total Electricity Supply 
Source: Authors’s calculations based on Worldwatch Institute (2007). 
The figure shows that renewable energy contributes considerably more to the 
electricity supply in Europe than in Japan and USA. However, this doesn’t mean that 
the unexploited renewable energy potential is particularly large in Europe. In fact, 
according to International Energy Agency (IEA) (2006) the hydropower generation 
capacity in Europe can still be expanded by about 75%, whereas other regions in the 
world have much larger potentials. 
 
 
Figure 9.  World Hydropower Potential. 
Source: International Energy Agency (IEA) (2006). 
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According to the resource assessment shown at the figure, the largest potentials for 
development of additional hydropower capacity are in the developing countries.  
Non-hydropower renewables are, however, new and rapidly growing sources of 
electricity. The countries that are leading in taking these new technologies into use 
are all European (except New Zealand) as shown on figure 7. 
 
 
Figure 10. Share of Non-Hydro Renewables in Electricity Generation in OECD Countries, 
1997 and 2002. 
Source: International Energy Agency (IEA) (2004). 
The figure also shows that the share of non-hydro renewables in electricity 
generation can change dramatically in just 5 years. This is reassuring for the binding 
target of 20% renewable energy adopted by the European Council and the even more 
ambitious targets debated in individual member states. The most ambitious vision is 
the postcarbon society, that is, a society where fossil fuel combustion is history at 
least without carbon capturing and sequestration. Together with the potential for 
nuclear energy and fossil energy with carbon capturing and sequestration there are 
sufficient European energy resources to fully supply the European energy needs if so 
desired.  
Most of these resources are, however, sources of electric power. Electric power has 
limited opportunity for application in a transport sector, which is technologically 
locked in to combustion of oil-based transport fuels. The most important mission of 
hydrogen and fuel cell technology is that it offers an opportunity to use electricity 
(and second generation biofuels) for automotive purposes. In this sense, it is a 
prerequisite for satisfying the European energy demand not only related to 
stationary process, heating, lighting, but also for transport on European sources 
renewable, nuclear, and fossil-CCS energy. Hydrogen and fuel cells offers an 
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opportunity to base European transport on European energy sources, but it should 
be noted that the actual shift from oil to European sources is a process that probably 
runs over several decades. 
Thus, the potential for renewable energy depends very much on socioeconomic 
factors such as the willingness to use land areas for energy purpose, the investment 
in transmission infrastructure to exploit remote (e.g., at sea) sources for renewable 
electricity, and the capacity of the power system to absorb power supply from 
intermittent sources. 
Hydrogen offers the opportunity to store intermittent power and therefore 
represents a direct solution to the latter problem. In this sense hydrogen technology 
can increase the capacity of the European power sector to make use of domestic 
renewable sources of electricity and thereby strengthen supply security. 
The potential for the second non-fossil source of hydrogen feedstock, nuclear power, 
shares similar conditions. The binding constraint is the willingness to abandon land 
areas that can be used for location of power plants and final deposition. Expansion of 
the power generation and final deposition capacity will be of least cost at locations 
that already are abandoned for nuclear power purposes. 
Hydrogen technology does not change this, but it can make use of the economies in a 
constant load by producing hydrogen with off-peak electricity. 
The third non-fossil non-fossil source of hydrogen feedstock is biomass. Biomass is 
used to generate hydrogen directly through gasification or fermentation rather than 
indirectly through combustion, power generation, and electrolysis. Biomass is the 
most dispersed source of energy and thus  
The conclusion is that hydrogen technology offers a way to get more useful energy 
out of the power generation capacity even if it is base-load or intermittent. Thereby, 
it enables large market shares for European and in this sense more reliable energy 
sources. 
 
Hydrogen and security of energy supply 
Hydrogen and fuel cell technology will enable Europe to diversify the primary 
energy basis of transport fuels to a variety of alternative feedstock. In the following 
table we summarize the results 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2. Supply security impacts of substituting oil by alternative feedstock as primary 
energy basis for transport fuels. 
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Feedstock Price Market power 
and geopolicy 
Global scarcity 
Natural gas 0 0 0 
Coal + ++ + 
Renewable electricity +++ +++ +++ 
Biomass ++ +++ + 
Uranium +++ + + 
Thorium +++ ++ ++ 
 
To sum up from the preceding sections it is not easy to find empirical support for the 
idea that the supply of hydrogen based on natural gas will be more secure than the 
supply of petrol and diesel based on oil. 
In general, natural gas and to some extent coal prices change very closely in parallel 
with oil prices. Given the close substitution with oil, it is unlikely that the price of 
natural gas becomes independent of the oil price. When the geographical distribution 
of the remaining natural gas resources is taken into account, the prospects of 
developing competitive spot markets with prices independent of the oil price are not 
good. 
Globally, the future supply of natural gas is controlled by the same countries 
controlling the future supply of oil and a “Gas-OPEC” is a realistic possibility.  
Coal resources are concentrated too, but the risk of collusion between the 
governments involved is rather small. Coal resources are non-renewable and in this 
respect global scarcity is still an issue although there is enough of it. In particular, 
Europe will be increasingly dependent on non-renewable resources from other parts 
of the world. 
In contrast, hydrogen based on non-fossil electricity or directly extracted from 
biomass would represent a rather secure source of energy supply. There is little 
reason to expect use of market power and political instability to give rise to supply 
disruptions in these markets. 
Renewables like hydro, wind, wave, and solar and nuclear like thorium reactors have 
the potential to eventually be the dominant supply technologies with prices 
independent of oil. 
Biomass is renewable, but limited in comparison with the energy consumption in 
Europe as well as globally. The contribution of biofuels to global transport energy 
demand will hardly exceed 25%. In this sense it is globally scarce although it is 
renewable. 
Uranium is not plentiful in Europe, but Europe is well endowed with thorium, which 
often is advocated as promising candidate for fourth generation nuclear power 
technology. 
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These conclusions are in line with a recent analysis of energy supply security by 
International Energy Agency (IEA) (2007a). This analysis finds that for a sample of 
European countries it would benefit energy supply security to replace fossil by non-
fossil fuels in power generation, but not to replace coal by natural gas. However, 
replacing petrol and diesel by biofuels would give lower risk from disruption of oil 
supplies but higher risk from disruption of natural gas supplies that is an important 
input in biofuel production. 
In addition to the supply security of feedstock, it should be noted that two properties 
of hydrogen must be expected to improve the security of energy supply associated 
with renewable energy in Europe. First, hydrogen is highly “convertible” from any 
energy form and to electricity. Concurrently with reduction of the loss of energy in 
these conversions hydrogen will facilitate a much more diverse structure of primary 
energy sources. Second, hydrogen can store the energy produced by intermittent 
sources and by base-load plants in off-peak periods. 
 
Oil and gas dependency 
Oil and gas dependency ratio 
Disruption of oil supplies are of course not equally important to all countries. Some 
countries rely more on oil than others. To analyse the difference in oil dependency – 
and the challenge of becoming oil independent – we use a net export measure as 
described below.  
As shown above, oil and natural gas are very close substitutes and the oil and gas 
dependency is more informative than the oil dependency alone. Thus instead of net 
oil imports, the net imports of oil and natural gas is the interesting issue. 
The analysis of natural gas and crude oil price shows that in the past the natural gas 
price has been remarkabley stable relative to the oil price. Thus the two primary 
energy commodities can be combined to one aggregate oil and natural gas 
commodity. 
The degree of oil and gas dependency can be measured as the amount of oil and gas 
the economy imports (net of exports) compared to GDP , the aggregate output (or 
income originating from this output) of the economy. Oil price increases (and 
subsequently natural gas price increases) raise the import bill, but the export revenue 
as well. How important the net bill of an oil and gas price increase is to the economy, 
therefore depends on the ratio of net import of oil and gas to GDP.  
This oil and gas dependency ratio can be derived from trade statistics and national 
accounts, but also from production and consumption figures. The math behind this 
takes departure in the identity of supply and use of a given commodity (assuming no 
stock changes).  
 
Y + M = D + X  M – X = D – Y  (M – X)/GDP = (D – Y)/GDP, 
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where 
Y: Primary production of oil and natural gas 
M: Imports of oil and natural gas 
D: Gross inland consumption of oil and natural gas 
X: Export of oil and natural gas 
All variables are assumed to be in quantities of a homogeneous quality. 
Equation (1) states that if supply equals use (or demand), then net import of oil and 
natural gas is equivalent to the difference between domestic consumption and 
domestic production of oil and gas. The ratio of this difference to GDP is as good an 
indicator for oil dependency as the ratio of net import to GDP is. 
A low rate of production or a high rate of consumption (or both) to GDP makes the 
economy more vulnerable to an increasing oil price as described above. The figures 
below show how these two components affect the vulnerability of the European 
economies. 
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Figure 11. Primary Production and Gross Inland Consumption of Oil and Natural Gas as 
Ratios to GDP for European Economies (2004, MJ/€). 
Source: Eurostat Online Database, National Accounts and Energy Statistics. 
The production and consumption of and natural gas are measured in net calorific 
content whereas GDP is measured in € (2005 prices). The lower price per energy 
content of natural gas (cf. above) is reflected by adding 85% of the natural gas energy 
to the oil energy. The dotted diagonal line is the balance between the production and 
consumption rate that would leave an economy unaffected as to the primary terms of 
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trade effect of oil price increases. Economies to the right of the line har negative 
terms of trade effects from oil price increases whereas economies to the right of the 
line have positive effects. The further from the line, the stronger effects.  
The figure shows that in particular Norway, but to some degree Denmark as well in 
2004 benefitted from increasing oil prices whereas UK, the Netherlands, and 
Romania are close to neutrality. Bulgaria seems to be the most vulnerable of the 
European economies. 
The following figure offers a closer look at the economies with production and 
consumption rates below 10 MJ per €. 
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Figure 12. Primary Production and Gross Inland Consumption of Oil and Natural Gas as 
Ratios to GDP for European Economies with Rates below 10 MJ per € (2004, MJ/€). 
Source: Eurostat Online Database, National Accounts and Energy Statistics. 
The EU economies are with a few exceptions - Denmark, UK, and the Netherlands - 
very vulnerable to future oil price increases. As the oil and natural gas fields are 
depleted in the coming decades, these countries will be as vulnerable as the other 
EU15 countries with a energy consumption to GDP ratio of 2.5-5 GJ/€. Most of the 
vulnerability of Europe is, however, in the EU10 economies. The figures suggest that 
if they apply the same technological and institutional solutions as in EU15, they can 
double or triple their production without increasing their energy consumption. 
It is possible that some of the EU10 countries will find it attractive to produce non-
fossil energy or hydrogen for export to EU15. However, the primary strategy for 
closing the vulnerability gap will probably be to implement the technological and 
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institutional solutions that have produced a lower dependency rate in the EU15 
countries. 
Any strategy aiming at an oil price resilient economy must include measures that 
expand primary production of oil and gas or equivalent fuels or reduce oil and 
natural gas consumption or both. To attain oil price neutrality would at the present 
rate of oil and gas production would require a reduction of the consumption rate by 
more than 70%. However, the oil production in Europe is already declining and the 
natural gas production will follow suit. 
The countries facing the most adverse macroeconomic effects of future oil price 
increases are those with less economic strength. 
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Figure 13. Oil and Natural Gas Dependency and Per Capita Income in Europe (2004). 
Source: Eurostat Online Database, National Accounts and Energy Statistics. 
The figure shows most European countries arranged according to their oil and 
natural gas dependency and their per capita income in 2004 (in 2005 prices). With a 
few exceptions (Luxembourg, Belgium, and Spain), the most vulnerable economies 
are those with income levels below €20,000 per capita, whereas those with incomes 
above this level are more resilient. 
 
Conclusions 
The conclusion is that the macroeconomic effects of substituting petrol and diesel by 
hydrogen are not so much related to the hydrogen itself. It is only an energy carrier 
and the effects of using one energy carrier for another are not important from a 
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macroeconomic point of view. Likewise the effects of using one power-train 
technology in the vehicles rather than another. 
The macroeconomic effects are related to whether the hydrogen is produced from 
domestic or foreign energy sources. In the long term natural gas as well as oil will be 
exclusively imported to Europe whereas the domestic resources will include 
renewable energy sources as well as nuclear waste and carbon deposition capacities. 
The development of the domestic resources will make the European economies less 
dependent on oil price increases and could contribute to the full realisation of the 
employment growth potential. 
If domestic production of hydrogen based on domestic resources should contribute 
to less vulnerable 
Natural gas based hydrogen can like imported bio-fuels be a necessary stepping 
stone to the realisation of the domestic energy sources. 
This raises the questions for future research of dynamics and sequencing of phasing 
in and phasing out of the particular primary energy/fuel transformations.  
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